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I.

INTRODUCTION

T

here were essentially two reasons why the modern international humanitarian law (IHL)/law of armed conflict (LOAC) began its development in
the middle of the nineteenth century, one commendably idealistic and the
other profoundly pragmatic. The first was about altruistic concern for basic
humanity in relation to the treatment of the victims of war. It resulted in
the creation of the Red Cross movement and the series of Geneva conventions, the first of which was agreed in 1864. It also produced the first international agreement in modern times prohibiting the use of a weapon for
reasons of humanity, the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration.1 That Declaration
has been followed by a variety of treaties aimed at banning or restricting
the use of weapons that fail to comply with the now well-established customary principles of humanity and distinction.2
The second reason was driven by the selfish—or national—interests of
the most powerful States; it resulted initially in the 1856 Paris Declaration,
the essential purpose of which was to secure freedom of navigation on the
high seas for commercial shipping, specifically to ensure the continuation
of extremely lucrative maritime trade in time of war.3 The debate over the
importance of the freedom to continue trading activities at sea during war
became politically significant, not least in Britain, the pre-eminent naval
and maritime trading power, where commercial trading interests outmaneuvered the naval lobby in influencing diplomatic negotiations to do
with the regulation of warfare at sea. While trading interests invariably
sought to protect freedom of movement on the high seas, naval interests
were more concerned with the purposes of naval warfare, which included
1. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId
=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C.
2. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70, 71 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]; Steven Haines,
The Developing Law of Weapons: Humanity, Distinction and Precautions in Attack, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 273, 289–91 (Andrew
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014).
3. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907).
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applying economic pressure on opposing belligerents through the interdiction of their maritime trade (including that carried in neutral shipping).
Even with the acknowledgement of neutral rights, economic warfare at sea
necessitated a certain amount of navigational disruption that threatened
commercial interests in general. As a consequence, there was significant
tension between naval and commercial shipping interests during the period
of intense globalization in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
and this helped form the political context for pre-First World War developments in the IHL/LOAC applicable at sea.4 One of those developments
was concerned with the legal regulation of the sea mine.
Sea mines are extremely effective sea-denial weapons. Opposing navies
in time of conflict are locked in a basic struggle for sea control, the attainment of which allows them to conduct other operations, to project naval
power ashore and to interdict enemy trade (the principal ways in which navies bring their influence to bear on the wider conflict). They achieve seacontrol for themselves through operations that deny it to their opponents.
Sea-denial weapons have become especially important in modern naval
warfare through technological developments since the nineteenth century,
reducing, though by no means eliminating, the need for major set-piece
battles between opposing surface forces. Submarines, maritime airpower
and shore-based missiles all pose significant threats to surface naval forces.
Prior to their arrival as a factor in naval warfare, however, came the sea
mine.
Naval forces are extremely vulnerable to damage from mines and no
responsible naval commander will willingly take his force into waters where
they are known to have been laid without first deploying countermeasures.
Relatively small numbers of mines can seriously curtail the operations of a
large and otherwise powerful naval force. Sea mines have notable asymmetric effects.
Of course, mines are not merely sea-denial weapons causing problems
for opposing navies. They are also an excellent means of disrupting an enemy’s maritime trading activities, including preventing merchant shipping
entering an enemy’s ports. Indeed, as shall be seen, it was this use that was
the most significant during the two major naval wars of the twentieth cen4. For recent and important works on this subject, see NICHOLAS A. LAMBERT,
PLANNING ARMAGEDDON: BRITISH ECONOMIC WARFARE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR
(2012); JAN M. LEMNITZER, POWER, LAW AND THE END OF PRIVATEERING (2014); STEPHEN COBB, PREPARING FOR BLOCKADE 1885–1914: NAVAL CONTINGENCY FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE (2013).
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tury. They can also be used defensively to deny access to a belligerent’s (or
a neutral’s) coast and ports by the naval forces of the enemy, as well as in a
protective sense to secure shipping routes by preventing both enemy surface ships and submarines using those waters.5
Perhaps surprisingly, the only treaty to date dealing with the regulation
of sea mines is now over a century old. The 1907 Hague Convention VIII
Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines6 was aimed
at regulating a weapon that seriously threatened both major surface warships and merchant ships. It was a response to the then available technology, principally mines triggered by direct contact with the hull of a ship. Automatic submarine contact mines were—and remain—relatively simple devices. Even today, while there are certainly far more sophisticated mines
capable of being targeted at specific types of vessel—or even individual
ships—through their reaction to such influences as pressure, sound and
magnetic signature, a substantial proportion of sea mines are still triggered
by contact. So, although over a century old, the Convention governs a
weapon still in broad circulation and still a significant asymmetric threat to
all maritime forces, including blue water navies. 7
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to assess the 1907 Convention from
a twenty-first century perspective. I start with background briefs on the
historical context (both developments in sea mines prior to 1907 and the
wider backdrop to the conference in The Hague), which leads into a description of the content of the 1907 Convention, followed by an account of
relevant practice and other developments since 1907.
5. See the discussion in SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 169–70 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995). The San Remo
Manual is an important document in relation to the law regulating sea mines and it will be
the focus of specific comment below.
6. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332.
7. Contact mines are common, the Chinese and Iranians being just two interesting examples of States possessing them. For a discussion of Chinese mining capabilities, see
Andrew S Erikson, Lyle J Goldstein & William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA
Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability, 3 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES, no. 3, June 2009, available at
https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Publications.aspx (then China Maritime Study No.
3 June 2009 hyperlink). For a discussion of Iran’s mining capability, see Fariborz
Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (Sept 2008),
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus87.pdf;
Martin
Wählisch, The Iran–U.S. Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law, 37 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE 22 (2012), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37waehlisch-the-iran-u.s.-dispute.pdf.
TO
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEA MINES PRIOR TO 19078

Sea mines were probably first used during the siege of Antwerp in 1584–
85, but it took almost another two hundred years for any serious development of this means of warfare. The release of floating kegs of explosives
upstream of British naval vessels in the Delaware River was proposed by
David Bushnell during the American War of Independence (1775–82).
They proved to be largely unsuccessful on that occasion due to the vigilance of lookouts on the British ships. Another American, Robert Fulton,
tried to convince both the French and the British during the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars (1793–15) that their opponent’s ships could be sunk
using towed explosives. Neither side took his idea up, however, apparently
because each regarded sea mines as a barbaric and unethical means of warfare.9
These first attempts to develop weapons that would damage the hulls
of enemy ships produced devices whose operation was more akin to what
are now referred to as “torpedoes” and, indeed, that term rather than
“mines” was often used to describe them. The first use of a weapon similar
to what would now be described as a sea mine occurred during the Crimean War (1853–56), when the Russians used them as a means of harbor defense in both the Baltic and the Black Sea. Designed by Moritz von Jacobi
and Immanuel Nobel (father of Alfred), they were triggered automatically
on contact with a ship’s hull by means of a chemical fuse. They were not a
great success in terms of their explosive effect. One exploded under the
8. No original research has been undertaken to inform the account of the historical
development of sea mines that follows. Rather, the account relies heavily on two works in
particular that are arguably essential references for the entire discussion of sea mines:
HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA (1992) and JAMES J. BUSUTTIL, NAVAL
WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF WAR 12–100 (1998). Additional
references are the useful commentaries included in the two relevant collections of documents: DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 103–4 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
3d ed. 2000) and Howard S. Levie, Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 140 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988). Unless quoting directly from these sources, in order to reduce the number
of footnotes no repeated reference will be made to them hereafter in discussions of historical developments.
9. It is interesting to note this Napoleonic era concern with humanity in the conduct
of war, predating the formal introduction and development of what is now recognized as
weapons law by half a century—or even a full century if the Hague conferences in 1899
and 1907 are regarded as the true birth of IHL/LOAC weapons law.
416
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British warship HMS Merlin, but did not do any real damage.10 The first
ship to be sunk by a naval mine was the USS Cairo, sunk on the Yazoo
River in Mississippi in 1862 during the American Civil War. That mine was
not activated by contact with the ship’s hull, but by a command wire arrangement operated from the shore.11 That arrangement certainly meant
that that particular mine was capable of discrimination in targeting. The
contact mine, however, was inherently indiscriminate in its effect, being
unable to distinguish between warships and merchant vessels. By design,
therefore, it represented a profound threat to free navigation, including on
the high seas and, if laid in significant numbers and in wide areas, had the
potential seriously to undermine maritime commercial trade. For that reason, influential trading interests would be in favor of banning or greatly
restricting its use. At the same time, States began to consider regulation for
entirely pragmatic reasons based on national interests. Since mines were
also capable of inflicting serious and widespread injury to those serving in
the ships that fell victim to them, there was an additional idealistic/humanitarian rationale for limiting their use.
III.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR 1907 HAGUE

By the end of the nineteenth century, idealistic and pragmatic tendencies
influencing the developing IHL/LOAC had begun to coalesce. In 1899,
through the personal initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, a conference
was convened in The Hague, the principle purpose of which was to limit
armaments. It resulted in three conventions and three weapons-related declarations. Only one of these documents was directly related to naval war
(1899 Hague Convention III,12 which extended the provisions of the 1864
Geneva Convention13 to war at sea). The priority at that point was regulating war on land.
Wars between great powers during the nineteenth century had been
many and varied (contrary to the modern myth that Europe was relatively
10. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA 549–50 (Mines and Mine
Warfare) (Peter Kemp ed., 1976).
11. Rob Hoole, The Development of Naval Mine Warfare, MINEWARFARE & CLEARANCE
DIVING OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION, www.mcdoa.org.uk/development_of_minewarfare.h
tm (last visited May 13, 2014).
12. Convention No. III for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of
the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1 Bevans 263.
13. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in the Armies
in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361.
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peaceful from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the
Great War in 1914).14 They had also frequently included naval engagements. What there had not been, however, was a general great power war
of sufficient intensity and duration that naval war in all its manifestations
had become a decisively significant part of it. There had been no major and
sustained confrontations between great power navies since the early nineteenth century.
General, multinational great power wars have been the engines of
change for many international developments in the modern era. Their absence, and the limited nature of the naval campaigns during the lesser great
power wars that were fought in the decades following 1815, meant both a
paucity of sufficient State practice to generate shifts in the customary law
of naval war, and a lack of a motive born of experience to generate positive change through the development of treaty law. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the 1899 Hague Conference devoted so little time to
naval issues.
That conference was to have been the first of a series of peace conferences. While the second conference met in 1907, the next, envisaged for
1914 or 1915, was not convened because of the outbreak of war between
the European great powers. In fact, the 1907 Hague Conference had anticipated such a war and, importantly, had also expected it to involve a major
naval confrontation. There were two reasons for this. First, in between the
first and second conferences, there occurred a substantial war between two
major powers that had a significant naval dimension. Second, there was a
growing expectation that the next great power war involving European
powers had the potential to feature a major naval war because of the naval
arms race between Britain and Germany and the notable rise in naval capabilities generally.
Significantly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 had a substantial maritime dimension, most strikingly leading to the deployment of a Russian
fleet from the Baltic to the Far East, where it was famously defeated at the
Battle of Tsushima by the Imperial Japanese Navy commanded by Admiral

14. There were fourteen wars involving great powers in Europe between 1815 and
1914. See SANDRA HALPERIN, WAR AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EUROPE: THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION REVISITED 6 (2004). It is arguably the case that those who
were alive in 1914 were somewhat less surprised by the outbreak of war that summer than
some eminent historians writing about the subject a century after (although the former
would have been greatly surprised by its duration and effects).
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Togo Heihachiro.15 The war sent shockwaves through the international system at the time, not least because it resulted in an Asian power defeating a
European great power. It understandably raised the profile of naval war
considerably. When coupled with the growing Anglo-German naval antagonism marked by an intense naval arms race, naval war was placed firmly
on the international diplomatic agenda.16
The Russo-Japanese War’s most notable naval engagement was undoubtedly the Battle of Tsushima, the most significant fleet engagement
since Trafalgar, exactly a century earlier. The bulk of the Russian fleet that
fought in that battle had sailed halfway around the world to do so. It was
deployed for that purpose as a reaction to the sinking off Port Arthur on
March 31, 1904 of the Russian flagship, the Petropavlovsk, which also resulted in the death of Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, the charismatic,
courageous and immensely popular commander of Russian naval forces in
the region, whose decapitated body went down with his flagship. Petropavlovsk was not the victim of conventional ship-to-ship combat—it had been
struck by a Japanese automatic submarine contact mine. The German Kaiser wrote to Tsar Nicholas to express his “sincerest and heartfelt sympathy
to you at the loss of so brave an admiral, who was personally well known
to me—and so many brave sailors.”17 Masses were celebrated to the
memory of Makarov across the Russian Empire. Sea mines were not getting a positive press in Russia. Elsewhere, those States with substantial surface fleets were awakened to the potential destructive impact of the weapon and the vulnerability of the substantial investment their fleets of warships, in particular the considerable number of “dreadnought” battleships,
represented.
Throughout the war, mines were laid by and affected both belligerents.
The Russians laid a minefield off Port Arthur which cost the Japanese two
of their battleships, four cruisers, two destroyers and a torpedo boat. At the
same time, merchant shipping was being disrupted, with mines seriously
impeding their free navigation. This caused the British—and other neu15. For a recent study of naval aspects of this war, see CONSTANTIVE PLESHAKOV,
THE TSAR’S LAST ARMADA: THE EPIC VOYAGE TO THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA (2002).
16. For accounts of the naval rivalry between these two powers, see, e.g., PAUL M.
KENNEDY, THE RISE OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM 1860–1914 (1980); ROBERT K. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF THE GREAT
WAR (1991); MATTHEW S. SELIGMANN, THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE GERMAN THREAT:
ADMIRALTY PLANS TO PROTECT BRITISH TRADE IN A WAR AGAINST GERMANY (2012).
17. PLESHAKOV, supra note 15, at 34.
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trals—considerable concern, with commercial trading interests bringing
their influence to bear on the British government’s policy as the second
Hague Conference approached.18 That 1907 conference came to be heavily
focused on maritime concerns. Of the total of fourteen conventions produced at the conference, nine were devoted to aspects of war at sea. The
eighth was that dealing with automatic submarine contact mines, the type
of mine that had caused substantial damage to both sides during the RussoJapanese War.
So, by 1907, sea mines had become a focus of serious concern and attention. Commercial trading interests tended to want them banned altogether, while naval interests wanted them regulated, but also saw the value
of them as sea-denial weapons and as a means of disrupting enemy trade.
Commercial interests in Britain were influential and attempted to persuade
the government to overrule naval opinion and to push for an outright ban.
The Royal Navy’s influence was not inconsequential, however. The British
position evolved to favor tight restrictions on mining activity, but there was
no attempt to arrive at an outright ban, not least because this was never
likely to be achieved during treaty negotiations. The most predictable outcome of the 1907 Conference would be a balanced agreement, regulating
the use of potentially indiscriminate sea mines, but certainly not banning
them altogether.
IV.

THE PROVISIONS OF 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION VIII

The 1907 Convention consists of a preamble and a total of thirteen articles.
Only the first five articles posit the rules governing the characteristics of
those mines permitted and the ways in which they should be used; all five
will be considered. Article 6 covers action to deal with those existing mines
that were contrary to the Convention (this will not be considered in detail
here, given its limited relevance today). Article 7, which covers the Convention’s application (restricting it to situations in which all belligerents are
party), will also be examined. Articles 8 through 13 will not be commented
upon as they deal with ratification and other procedural matters. In discussing each of the relevant articles, no detailed account is given of the traveaux
18. This and follow-on developments in the law governing naval operations was reflected subsequently, for example, in debate between Royal Navy officers in the pages of
their professional journal, The Naval Review. See Steven Haines, Law, War and the Conduct of
Naval Operations, in DREADNOUGHT TO DARING: 100 YEARS OF COMMENT, CONTROVERSY AND DEBATE IN THE NAVAL REVIEW 299, 301–3 (Peter Hore ed., 2012).
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préparatoires. Levie has already adequately discussed the drafting process for
each of these articles and it is not considered necessary to repeat his accounts or explanations in what follows below.19
A. Preamble
It is worth considering the Preamble as it makes a number of important
points as to the purpose of the Convention, raising questions as a result.
The Preamble made it very clear it was inspired by the desire to keep sea
routes open for some navigation, while going on to stress that it was about
regulating rather than banning the use of automatic submarine contact
mines.
Both the title of the 1907 Convention and the Preamble refer to “automatic submarine contact mines.” The operative articles omit the word
“submarine” when referring to the mines that are the focus of the text.
There is a simple reason for this. If a moored mine slips its mooring it will
float to the surface. A moored mine’s normal location in the water column
will be below the surface at a depth that will lead to contact with a passing
ship’s hull. It will not be visible, reducing the chances of a target vessel
avoiding it, but will remain effective in achieving the necessary contact with
the vessel. Indeed, the moored mine will also ensure that the target vessel is
holed below the waterline. The 1907 Convention clearly needed to cover
the possibility of moored mines floating to the surface, however, hence the
operative articles omitting the word “submarine.”
By defining the type of mine covered by the 1907 Convention, it did
not apply to sea mines in general. As Busutill has pointed out, “the spherical, ‘horned’ contact mine [is] triggered by the contact of a passing ship
against one of the ‘Hertz’ horns . . . [the] type of mine to which Hague
Convention VIII is addressed.”20 As noted above in the discussion of the
historical background, there were other mines in existence that were triggered in other ways than by contact; they were excluded from consideration. This is an important point to acknowledge, because, if the Convention agreed in 1907 had covered all devices then capable of being described
as sea mines, this would have given some credence to the view that it covered all forms of sea mines subsequently developed. As influence mine
technologies advanced in subsequent years, the 1907 Convention would
19. See the relevant sections in LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, at 27–50.
20. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 15–16.
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have also applied to them. By dealing very specifically with contact mines
and excluding other mines that then existed, however, the Convention is
arguably not extendable to other, subsequent, mines utilizing newer technologies. This is not, however, uncontentious. While Kalshoven believed
that the wording of the 1907 Convention effectively excluded other mines,
O’Connell in contrast suggested that, despite the wording of the rules
agreed in 1907, “it does not mean that the principle behind them is irrelevant . . . . [it] has rigidified in recent times so as to encompass the influence
as well as the anchored contact mine.”21 This clearly raises questions as to
how customary law has developed since 1907, an issue to which I return
briefly below when discussing Article 1 of the Convention.
The compromise articulated within the Preamble recognized the impossibility of obtaining a total ban on automatic submarine contact mines,
while acknowledging the vital importance of using mines in a way that did
not have a profound adverse effect on “peaceful navigation” along the
principal trading routes. Such navigation was not defined in the Convention, however—did it allude merely to that by neutral vessels or also to belligerent vessels carrying non-contraband cargo? This question was not answered. Peaceful navigation was also, arguably, not guaranteed, but was
only to be ensured “as far as possible.” The intention of the Convention
was stated as being to “mitigate the severity of war” and not to eradicate
mining altogether in such a way as to ensure freedom of navigation at the
expense of belligerents’ rights to conduct hostilities at sea.
Compromises, by definition, will never entirely satisfy all concerned.
Britain, prompted by its influential trading interests, eventually and predictably had to agree to less regulation than it would have liked, but stated in a
reservation that “the mere fact that this Convention does not prohibit a
particular act or proceeding must not be held to debar (Britain) from contesting its legitimacy.”22
B. Article 1
To quote Levie, “[Article 1] unquestionably contains the most important
provisions of the Convention and the only ones that place any real restrictions on the use of mines by belligerents as an incident of maritime
21. FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (1987); 2 D. P.
O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1138 (Ivan A. Shearer ed., 1984);
both quoted in BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 63–64.
22. THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 8, at 132.
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warfare.”23 The article is divided into three paragraphs. The first forbids the
laying of unanchored automatic contact mines unless they are constructed
in such a way that they become harmless within an hour after the person
laying them ceases to control them. The second forbids the laying of anchored automatic contact mines unless they become harmless as soon as
they break loose from their moorings. The final paragraph forbids the use
of torpedoes that do not become harmless when they have “missed their
mark.”
The first paragraph is effectively acknowledging the existence and utility of a form of defensive mine designed to be released from a ship being
pursued by an enemy warship, the intention being that the mine would
float into the path of the pursuing warship and cause it either to end its
pursuit or to be damaged when it came into contact with the mine. The
U.S. Navy has referred to these as “drifting mines” and itself developed six
types between 1915 and 1925 (and a further Mark 7 during the Second
World War), for example.24 Although these sorts of mines were usually
launched from the deck of the pursued vessel, they could be towed behind
it, ready to be slipped free to float into the path of a pursuing enemy warship when required. Such mines could well be in the water under tow for
extended periods while remaining under the control of the vessel launching
them. Once launched/slipped they became free floating. They needed to be
active to achieve their purpose, but that was clearly time limited. The limit
of one hour was regarded as adequate for the intended purpose and tactical
deployment of the weapon. After that time had elapsed, the mine needed
to become harmless, however, otherwise it would become a threat to shipping generally (thereby defeating the 1907 Convention’s declared object).
Arguably, this particular provision is now largely overtaken by events as
these sorts of mines are generally a thing of the past. Nevertheless, the
provision remains and should not be dismissed as entirely irrelevant for the
simple reason that it is feasible that such a weapon might be created in the
future. If it is, then this provision may need to be complied with (subject to
the applicability of the treaty law or its reflection in customary law). One
can envisage circumstances in which a navy may develop such a device or
the ship’s company of an individual ship might extemporize during a lowintensity coastal conflict, for example. Combatants often resort to battle23. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, at 31.
24. United States of America Mines, NAVAL WEAPONS, NAVAL TECHNOLOGY AND NAVAL REUNIONS, http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMUS_Mines.htm (updated
Jan. 13, 2013).
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field “invention” to respond to particular tactical threats. In Afghanistan,
for example, junior combatants are known to have weaponized otherwise
benign remote-controlled vehicles in order to cope with particular tactical
challenges, quite unaware of the need to ensure that the legality of such
weapons needs to be confirmed through legal review.25
In relation to all three types of weapon described in Article 1, there is
the requirement that they “become harmless.” What is meant by this
phrase? Busuttil has identified three possibilities, indicating that a mine free
floating for more than an hour, one that breaks its mooring or a torpedo
missing its target, should be designed to either self-destruct, disarm or sink
to the seabed. The last of these is perhaps the least satisfactory because an
armed device lying on the seabed will not be absolutely harmless (it might
be drawn into the bottom trawl of a passing fishing vessel or be activated
by a bottoming submarine, for example). Other types of mines are designed to lay on the seabed and remain intentionally active. That being the
case, while a contact mine sinking to the seabed to become “harmless”
might be the least satisfactory option identified by Busuttil, it perhaps remains an acceptable way of complying with the 1907 Convention.
On the other hand, if “to become harmless” means either to selfdestruct or to disarm, rather than simply sink, this would add credence to
the view that the 1907 Convention only applies to contact mines, with influence mines lying on the seabed not affected. The development of influence mines post-dated the Convention. It is a feature of their mode of operation that influence mines either rest on the seabed (ground mines) or
they sit in position within the water column, held in place by a mooring line
that is anchored to the seabed. Whether they are ground or moored influence mines, they remain in position to await the arrival of whatever vessel
has the required signature to trigger them. In the practical sense, ground
mines do not need to be physically anchored in place on the seabed. They
do, however, tend to be restricted in their use to shallower water than
moored mines (sixty meters—or two-hundred feet—being about the limit
for ground mines). If the 1907 Convention was to apply to influence
mines, then they would obviously all need to be anchored, or be obliged to
become harmless one hour after deployment, which would make deploying
them largely pointless.
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. Such battlefield extemporization was revealed to the author in discussion with
a former British commander of forces deployed in Helmand Province in Afghanistan.
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Dinstein has argued that there are no reasons why the Convention
should not apply to influence mines as well; indeed, he states that this is
what the rule “must” mean.26 While that proposition might at first not
sound unreasonable, it is unfortunately problematic. An inevitable consequence would be that, to be lawful, all influence ground mines would, once
deployed, have to be physically held in position by some form of anchoring. Many are not; they are not designed to be and it would be virtually impossible to modify existing mines and their manner of deployment to render them compliant with the 1907 Convention. The anchoring of ground
mines has never been formally agreed. It cannot here be regarded as a customary requirement since no evidence is available to demonstrate that any
State deploying such mines has ever done so in the belief that there is a
legal obligation to have them anchored to the seabed. There is neither the
practice nor the opinio juris to establish a customary norm. Indeed, if anything, practice indicates the opposite. The conclusion one is drawn to is
that the 1907 Convention does not apply to mines other than those contact
mines to which it specifically refers.
C. Article 2
Article 2 of the 1907 Convention forbids the laying of “automatic contact
mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.” This article is somewhat ambiguous in relation to both the location of legitimate minelaying and the extent to which it
is allowed for purposes additional to the interception of commercial shipping. Instinctively, it seems to mean a blockade should not be enforced by
the use of mines—until one deconstructs the wording. Is mining forbidden
in ports and inland waters? Is it restricted by the use of the phrase “off the
coast” to the territorial waters of the enemy, or might a minefield laid in
these circumstances extend into the high seas? What about the use of
mines in international straits in which the territorial seas of opposing belligerents meet and in which mining activities could render such straits impassable? On this latter point, the conference made a conscious decision
not to address the issue because the majority of States believed they had no
mandate to do so.27 Mining certainly occurred in ports and inland waters
26. Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of War at Sea, 10 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 46 (1980).
27. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 463, 502 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).
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prior to 1907, but it also continued after that date. It is impossible to reach
a clear and uncontentious conclusion to the questions raised by the wording in the article if one is concerned merely with the location of a minefield. The wording relating to location must be read along with the intended purpose of the mining that is forbidden.
Even then, however, the article is unsatisfactory. It seems that all a belligerent laying the mines needs to do is assert that the minefield’s purpose
is not exclusively to intercept commercial shipping. By stating that the minefield is also—or primarily—about denying access to enemy warships, for
example, the mining would not be contrary to the wording of the article.
One could go even further. How should the phrase “commercial shipping”
be interpreted? Elsewhere in the Convention reference is made to “peaceful shipping,” a phrase as already noted, is itself subject to some interpretation. Is the absence of the word “blockade” in this article of any significance (especially given the implication to be drawn from it)? Does “commercial shipping” mean all shipping, including neutral shipping and belligerent commercial shipping not carrying contraband? Would belligerent
merchant ships not carrying contraband, especially when sailing in escorted
convoys, represent something other than the “commercial shipping” covered by the wording of the article? One could go on posing questions of
this sort. Essentially, this article, the meaning of which seems quite
straightforward on first reading, is shot through with ambiguity and is profoundly unsatisfactory. Both Levie and Busuttil have discussed this problem in some detail. One is attracted to Busuttil’s conclusion, that the 1907
Convention
therefore forbids the laying of automatic contact mines in the internal waters and territorial sea, and on the high seas opposite the coasts and ports
of an enemy to a reasonable distance, if the State doing so has as its only
intent the cutting off of all commercial shipping, broadly understood. The
mining of the ports themselves or the inland waterways of an enemy to
carry out any intent is not forbidden by the Convention.28

Given the ease with which a belligerent could assert purposes other
than the interdiction of commercial shipping as the reasoning behind its
minelaying activities, the restrictions contained in this article are virtually
meaningless in any practical sense.

28. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 25.
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D. Article 3
Article 3 establishes an obligation on those laying mines to take “every possible precaution . . . for the safety of peaceful shipping.” It then goes on to
place on belligerents an obligation to “do their utmost to render [the]
mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under
surveillance, to notify the danger zones” to ship owners and other governments.
Aside from the issues already discussed about what is and what is not
“peaceful shipping,” there is a question raised by the use of the two different phrases “every possible precaution” and “do their utmost.” As Busuttil
has illustrated very well, such terminology can be the subject of different
interpretations. It must be said, however, that it is quite possible to become
far too obsessed with deconstructing phrases of this sort and arriving at
subtly different meanings, the fact that both have been used in the same
article doing nothing to stem the tendency to assume they indeed mean
different things. As Levie has noted, when regarded together with the
phrase “as soon as military exigencies permit,” one is left with an article
that is notable for its inherent flexibility, not a precise statement of clear
obligations. Nevertheless, all such phrases do tend to provide belligerents
laying minefields with ample opportunity either to avoid strict compliance
or to delay it, which is unfortunate in a treaty.
There is not much more that can usefully be said about this collection
of phrases. Their interpretations will, inevitably, be left to those laying
mines, with the precise meaning of “every possible precaution,” “do their
utmost” and “as soon as military contingencies permit” being left to their
judgment, be it good or otherwise. Ultimately, of course, a court or tribunal
may have to reach its own conclusions against a set of pertinent facts, but
that has yet to happen and is not currently in prospect. One suspects that
as long as the existence of minefields is notified through such media as Notices to Mariners and diplomatic communications (including today by informing the International Maritime Organization, the relevant UN specialized agency), identifying whether all other conditions have been adequately
met will be problematic. In that sense, the article is flawed, although it is so
because, of course, of the need to arrive at a text acceptable to those attending the Hague Conference in 1907.
Before leaving this article, there is one further comment that ought to
be made. There is a requirement for belligerents to “render these mines
harmless within a limited time.” What is not articulated is any sense of pre427
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cision as to what the word “limited” means. Mischievously, it might be interpreted as setting a timeframe of one-hundred years—which would still
be limited, strictly speaking. One should not be deliberately facetious. It is
more than likely that such a period would be regarded as excessive. What
exactly is meant, though, by this requirement of Article 3? One might be
forgiven for assuming that “limited” suggests a matter of days or possibly
even weeks; for most, it would certainly not suggest a number of years. Yet,
minefields have frequently been laid for effect over extended periods, especially in the sorts of general naval wars in which the bulk of such mines
have been used (the First and Second World Wars). Perhaps in the context
of 1907 and the then recent experience of naval war between Russia and
Japan, it was not unreasonable to measure timeframes in weeks or months
rather than years. Subsequent twentieth century experience has provided
clear evidence that time limits are almost invariably impossible to set—they
are, after all, subject to military exigencies.
E. Article 4
Article 4 imposes obligations on neutral powers similar to those imposed
on belligerents in relation to the deployment of mines. There is one important difference. Whereas Article 3 requires the laying of mines to be notified to ship owners and other States at some point after the mines are laid
(defined as being “as soon as military exigencies permit” after the laid
mines cease being under “surveillance”), Article 4 requires neutrals to inform ship owners and States prior to minelaying operations being conducted. The difference between these requirements to inform is understandable. A belligerent laying mines will seek to conduct such operations unopposed and will not, therefore, wish to inform the enemy of its intentions,
whereas a neutral laying mines for the security of its own waters will have
no such need and, indeed, will probably seek to give significant publicity to
its minelaying activities. Again, although the article does not stipulate precisely how this should be done, in practical terms the formal method of
communicating the location of mines will be by a combination of Notices
to Mariners and diplomatic channels (informally, of course, in the current
age of global communication and media activity, the information is likely to
be readily available to all concerned in very short order).
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F. Article 5
Article 5 turns to the subject of mine clearance “at the close of the war,”
but does so in what appears to be a potentially confusing manner. There
are two sentences in the article. The first declares that States are “to do
their utmost to remove the mines that they have laid, each Power removing
its own mines.” The second, seemingly contradictory, sentence goes on to
say that in relation to mines laid by a belligerent “off the coast of the other,
their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid
them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.” So, on the one hand the 1907 Convention requires States to clear their own mines while, on the other, it requires
them to clear the mines present in their own waters. What is to be made of
this?
Before dealing with the apparently contradictory content, something
needs to be said about when this article actually applies. This is of some
importance as it requires States to take mine clearance action “with the
least possible delay.” In order to know when mine clearance operations
should commence—or subsequently to judge the measure of any delay in
their conduct—one would surely need to have some idea when the moment of obligation had arrived. The article states that this moment is “the
close of the war,” but what, precisely, does that mean? The Convention
does not elaborate. Notwithstanding the fact that since the middle of the
twentieth century the term “armed conflict” has been preferred in legal
parlance to “war” (though the two terms are not precisely synonymous),
the phrase could be interpreted as either the suspension of hostilities
through some form of ceasefire (though presumably a general one and not
merely a temporary or local arrangement), the achievement of an armistice
agreement, or even the ultimate formal termination of war arrived at
through the signing of a treaty of peace.29 The latter could take, literally,
years. The mere suspension of hostilities, however, will not guarantee the
end of further resort to force, and mine clearance under those circumstances could well be premature. Busuttil analyses this issue (and much of
the 1907 Convention’s meaning) by reference to the authentic French
text.30 Unfortunately, his conclusions do not finally resolve the dilemma. In
29. See, e.g., the lengthy discussion about the means of terminating war in YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENCE 34–62 (4th ed. 2005).
30. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 72.
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the San Remo Manual the chosen terminology is “after the cessation of active hostilities,” reflecting Article 118 of 1949 Geneva Convention III31 and
Article 33 of 1977 Additional Protocol I.32 One needs perhaps to accept
that the precise moment critique defies clear definition, but that it will eventually emerge and become clear to all sides. After that point, mine clearance
should certainly proceed “with the least possible delay.”
Turning now to the question of which State should remove which
mines, although the two sentences in the article appear contradictory, they
are not absolutely so. One can deduce from a comparison of the two sentences that States have a responsibility to remove those mines they have
laid, except for those laid in the waters off the coasts of their enemy. In the
same vein as the comments about Article 2, the Convention does not stipulate what is meant by the phrase “off the coast.” To be consistent, I again
take what Busuttil has concluded, that this includes the territorial waters of
the State, but also the high seas out to a “reasonable distance,” and that
there is nothing more that can be said about the geographical extent of the
obligation.
Finally, although Article 5 directly applies to belligerents, it indirectly
also applies to neutrals who have laid mines off their coasts through the
statement in Article 4 that “Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact
mines off their coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.” Essentially neutral States must
clear those mines they have laid off their coasts.
G. Article 6
Article 6 deals with the arrangements to be taken by newly contracting
States whose existing mines could not comply with the provisions of the
1907 Convention. This article is now all but overtaken by events. Theoretically, it would still apply to any States that became party to the Convention
in the future. A total of thirty-seven States signed it at The Hague in 1907,
although only twenty of those subsequently ratified it to become parties. A
further five States acceded to it, the last being Finland, which did so on
December 30, 1918. Two further States, Fiji and South Africa, made declarations in 1973 and 1978, respectively, that they consider themselves parties
as a consequence of their previous status within the British Empire (Britain
31. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
32. Supra note 25.
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having become a party in 1909). Currently, therefore, there are twentyseven parties bound by its provisions and eight signatories merely bound
not to undermine the purpose of the Convention.33 With virtually all parties
having become so around a century ago and with the two most recent having done so almost four decades ago, one might safely assume that no further States will accede to the Convention, which means that this article almost certainly has no further practical effect.
H. Article 7
Article 7 declares that “the provisions of the . . . Convention do not apply
except between contracting Powers, and then only if all belligerents are
parties to the Convention.” This is an understandable provision reflecting
standard treaty law, especially in relation to a treaty that is not itself a codification of existing custom. While understandable, it has had a remarkable
effect. Since 1907 when the Convention was agreed in The Hague, there
has been no armed conflict during which it has actually applied. If it has
had any effect at all, therefore, it will have done so by virtue of its rules becoming regarded by a number of States as having achieved customary status through a combination of practice and opinio juris since the Convention
was agreed. This fact leads neatly to a discussion of practice, especially during the First and Second World Wars and thereafter.
V.

STATE PRACTICE AND SEA MINING SINCE 190734

There have been plenty of wars since 1907 to examine in the search for
relevant State practice. Without doubt, the two world wars have been by
far the most significant, with the first occurring less than five years after the
1907 Convention came into force in January 1910. Apart from those two
33. One of the early ratifying States was Austria-Hungary (1909) which divided into a
number of sovereign States (including the separate States of Austria and Hungary) following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War.
This could raise questions about State succession, although, in effect, neither State is likely
to have any involvement in the laying of sea mines as both are now landlocked. The same
applies, of course, to other landlocked parties, Luxembourg and Switzerland, both of
which became parties (in 1912 and 1910, respectively). Finally, although a further landlocked State signed the Convention (Serbia in 1907), it then failed to ratify. See LAW OF
NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 8, at 129–30.
34. Again, the historical detail in what follows relies greatly on the evidence outlined
in both LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, and BUSUTTIL, supra note 8.
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general great power wars, during which mines were used extensively by
both belligerents and neutrals, there have been a number of other conflicts
that have involved some use of sea mines. It is worth saying something
about all of these, which are addressed in the following three sections on
the First World War, the Second World War and on conflicts since 1945.
A. The First World War
Mining commenced immediately on the outbreak of hostilities in 1914,
with both belligerents and neutrals engaging in the laying of extensive
minefields in both coastal zones and across swathes of the high seas. Indeed, as if to signal the profound significance of mine warfare, the very
first navy on navy engagement in the war between Britain and Germany
was fired on August 5, 1914, the second day of the war, when the German
warship SMS Königin Luise was sunk by the British destroyer HMS Lance
while the former was engaged in offensive minelaying operations off the
ports of Harwich and Lowestoft.35 The following day the HMS Amphion, of
the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla based in Harwich, struck one of the Königin
Luise’s mines thirty-five miles east of Aldeburgh Napes. The one hundred
fifty members of her ship’s company lost when the mine exploded, together with an accountant officer killed during the previous day’s encounter
between Lance and Königin Luise, were the very first casualties suffered by
the British Empire during the First World War.36
While rival belligerents might have been expected to engage in both
minelaying activities and the operations to prevent them, neutral States also
set about laying defensive minefields around their coasts. Even prior to the
engagement between the Königin Luise and the Lance, the Dutch and the
Danes, both neutrals, had begun mining the waters in the Baltic and its ap35. PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 27 (1994) and Len
Barnett, A Well Known Incident Reassessed: The German Attempted Mining of the Thames in August
1914, 89 THE MARINER’S MIRROR 185–202 (2003). I had thought this incident was the
first shot fired in the naval war. That, however, occurred on the opposite side of the world
a few hours before when the Royal Australian Navy fired at a German merchant ship trying to exit Port Phillip Bay. That resulted in the RAN seizing a copy of the German cipher
which proved very useful as a key to what the High Seas Fleet was up to in the North Sea
(I am most grateful to Rear Admiral James Goldrick RAN for pointing this out to me).
36. THE ROYAL NAVY DAY BY DAY (Anthony B. Sainsbury ed., 2d ed. 1992); Allan
Mallinson, Churchill Struck the Decisive Blow Seven Days before the War, THE TIMES (London),
Aug. 2, 2014, at 74, 74–75.
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proaches on August 1 and 4, respectively. Further neutral mining was conducted in the opening weeks of the war by the Ottoman Empire (which
subsequently entered the war as a belligerent). From late September onwards, it laid mines in the waters off its coast in the eastern Mediterranean.
From then on, mining by most belligerents and significant neutrals remained a major feature of the naval war until hostilities ceased in late 1918.
Extensive minefields were laid by the belligerents, with claims and
counterclaims as to their legality under the 1907 Convention. This was despite the fact that, according to Article 7, it did not formally apply because
not all belligerents were party. Approximately a quarter of a million mines
were laid in total during the war by belligerents and neutrals alike. Perhaps
the most extensive minefield was that laid by the British in the North Sea
aimed at preventing German submarines transiting from their base ports
into the Atlantic, where their purpose was principally to sink Allied shipping. A particular criticism was the indiscriminate nature of mining activities by belligerents. Claims to that effect were followed by assertions that
responsive mining activity was merely in the nature of reprisal for the opposing belligerent’s indiscriminate mining that preceded it.
In all of this, the general purpose of the 1907 Convention appeared to
have been roundly defeated. It was not ignored entirely, however. Apart
from occasional references to it, with claims made by both sides that opposing belligerents were in breach, there were hints that its detailed provisions relating to the types of mines permitted and the manner of their deployment were gaining at least some traction. There were demands, for example, that moored mines should become harmless on slipping their moorings and the United States, in February 1915 (when it was still neutral),
urged belligerents not to lay any floating mines on either the high seas or in
territorial waters.
Perhaps the most obvious and important point to make about the use
of sea mines subsequent to the coming into force of the 1907 Convention
is that the desire of commercial shipping interests to limit the use of mining and to ensure that trading routes remained open and safe during hostilities at sea was confounded. The use of mines during the Russo-Japanese
War had given some hint as to their potential significantly to affect maritime trade and the general conduct of war at sea. Experience of mining
then was, however, nothing like as intense as that during the years of major
naval war in the decade following the negotiation and coming into force of
the Convention. It should be remembered that the outbreak of the First
World War effectively brought to an end the first major period of globali433
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zation. It massively disrupted trade and the sea mine was one of the main
reasons. Here was confirmation, if it were needed, that commercial trading
interests in the latter years of the nineteenth century and the opening years
of the twentieth were absolutely correct in their understanding of the potential that mines had to disrupt their activities. The fact that mining had
this effect also, of course, proved to naval authorities that they were similarly correct in their assumptions about the belligerent utility of the weapon.
For the overall effect and the extent to which mining practice developed during the First World War, one can do no better than quote Busuttil’s conclusions:
Naval mines were used by all belligerents and many neutrals; minefields
were used to isolate the enemy by cutting off ocean borne supplies; minefields were laid to control and regulate neutral shipping; any type of ship,
neutral, convoyed or otherwise, that entered the minefields was liable to
be sunk; the mined danger zones were usually notified so that ships could
avoid them, although the danger zones were often described in a general
way; and the protests and counter-protests concerning mining diminished
with time and appeared to be no impediment to the proliferation of naval
mines and the destruction of shipping which the mines caused.37

B. The Second World War
While the Second World War is generally regarded as having opened with
the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, some historians regard
it as having started earlier with such precursor conflicts as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 or the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.
Although neither of these involved naval mine warfare, one precursor conflict that did was the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), which was particularly
notable for the intervention by Germany on the side of Nationalist forces.
Its involvement included the use of submarines to lay mines off the Spanish coast to prevent support for Republican forces arriving by sea. While
the effect was not profound (only five merchant ships were hit by mines),
minelaying by submarines in that civil war represented the first of three
significant innovations in mine warfare that were to feature greatly during

37. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 33.
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the global war that followed.38 The other two were the laying of mines by
aircraft and the deployment of influence mines, including magnetic, acoustic and pressure mines.
The method used to lay mines is of absolutely no significance in the
context of the 1907 Convention; the fact that a mine is laid by a submarine
or by an aircraft does not mean that it is not covered by the Convention’s
provisions. In contrast, the development and introduction of influence
mines is of some significance, if only in the negative sense. As is argued
above, the 1907 Convention, strictly speaking, excludes consideration of
anything other than contact mines, which means that a considerable number of those mines deployed during the Second World War would not appear to be regulated by it. While that is acknowledged, it should not be assumed that the Convention was necessarily irrelevant in all senses with respect to them (something to be returned to below).
As in the First World War, minelaying commenced immediately after
war broke out in September 1939, with both Germany and Britain laying
extensive minefields (using both contact and influence mines). The German naval Commander in Chief, Admiral Raeder, announced that the laying of mines had been conducted strictly within the provisions of the 1907
Convention, in particular pointing out that, because Britain had decided to
place its merchant ships in convoy under the protection of warships, commercial trading routes into British ports no longer existed, and that the Article 2 ban on the use of mines solely for the purpose of intercepting commercial shipping had not, therefore, been breached.
Both sides gave notification of their mining activities. Indeed, in December of that year Britain announced its intention to lay further fields in
the North Sea, an advance notification not required by the terms of the
Convention. Further mining and associated notifications followed. In August 1940, Germany went so far as to announce a total blockade of the
British coast, stating that the whole sea area around the British Isles had
been mined. It would seem that the 1907 Convention’s requirement to notify was being honored (regardless of the types of mines laid); presumably
with both belligerents accepting that, as mutual parties, they would choose
to comply with its provisions on notification. One notable breach of the
law, however, was that committed by the British when they mined Norwe-

38. Although there had been rumors that submarines were used to lay mines during
the First World War.
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gian territorial waters on April 8, 1940, four days before the German invasion on April 12 (up until which Norway had remained a neutral).39
Mines were not laid only at sea (either on the high seas or in territorial
waters). In May 1940, for example, Churchill authorized Operation Royal
Marine to close the Rhine to river traffic. A total of 1,184 mines were
dropped into the Rhine and a further three hundred sixty into the Moselle
by the Royal Air Force. By the first week in June 1940 it was reported to
Churchill that aerial reconnaissance had shown that traffic from Karlsruhe
to Mainz had been “totally suspended.”40
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war between
the United States and Japan, mines were laid extensively by the United
States in the Pacific theater throughout the period of hostilities to 1945.
They were laid by aircraft, submarines and surface ships to block approximately one hundred fifty enemy ports and harbors. This included, from
March 1945, the implementation of Operation Starvation, which involved
the aerial laying of approximately twelve thousand mines in Japanese harbors with the clear intention of driving Japan to capitulation by starving it
of the resources necessary to continue the war.
In all there were probably as many as a million sea mines laid during
the Second World War. Estimates of the damage they caused are very
rough, principally because it was often unclear whether shipping casualties
were the result of attacks by submarines or by contact with mines. Despite
this factor making it difficult to arrive at reliable figures for mine casualties,
there is no denying that mines had great effect. Allied ships sunk by mines
were estimated to number in the order of between three and five hundred;
Axis casualties were probably over two thousand five hundred. Again, it is
useful to turn to Busuttil for his observations on mine warfare during the
war:
First, there was only a minimal replay of the protests and counter-protests
at mining seen during World War I. Second, mining was primarily directed at the destruction of the commercial and industrial infrastructure
of the enemy. Third, very many mines were sown, at least double and
perhaps quadruple the number laid during World War I, Fourth, the ex39. Today this would, of course, be a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, but it
is also appropriate to mention in the context of this discussion that it was also contrary to
Article 2 of 1907 Hague Convention XIII. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
40. MARTIN GILBERT, 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR 1939–1941, at 487
(1983).
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plicit use of mines to force Japan to capitulation, ‘Operation Starvation’,
which very nearly lived up to its name, was not, and to this day has not
been, condemned as illegal.41

We can add to this that the presence of minefields was generally notified in a manner accessible to both opposing belligerents and neutrals. As
had previously been the case during the First World War, the sheer volume
of mines laid in the years 1939–45, together with the geographical extent of
minefields both around coasts and on the high seas, leads one inexorably to
the conclusion that the early twentieth century attempt to limit mining
through the negotiation of the 1907 Convention was an abject failure. Certainly, the purpose of the Convention, as expressed in its Preamble, “to
restrict and regulate” mining “to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure
. . . to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled” seems in retrospect to have been profoundly unrealistic. Arguably, the declared object
of the 1907 Convention was defeated in the first few days of the first major
naval campaign following its negotiation, and this was repeated just over
two decades later in the opening days of the Second World War.
C. Mining Post-1945
There has been no general great power/global war involving sustained and
extensive naval operations profoundly affecting maritime trade since 1945.
The extensive mining that took place in both the First and Second World
Wars has simply not been repeated. When mining has been used by belligerents in the limited wars since then, it has been more to do with sea denial, with their intended effect being on opposing naval forces, rather than
about an effective means of conducting economic warfare by attacks on
maritime trade.42
This was certainly the case during the Korean War, between 1950 and
1953. Mines were used by North Korea to confound United Nations’ forces with some effect. The invasion of Wonsan, planned for October 1950,
was delayed by just over a week because approximately three thousand
mines (both contact and influence) had been laid for defensive purposes in
Wonsan harbor. Subsequently, Chinese and North Korean forces regularly
laid mines, which had the effect of restricting UN coastal operations for

41. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 37.
42. See id. at 38–43.
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the rest of the war. Some of those laid were free floating or drifting mines
and, therefore, contrary to the terms of the 1907 Convention.
The mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 during the Vietnam War was
with inactive mines sown by aircraft. They were timed to activate after
three days, allowing vessels in Haiphong to depart the port during the three
days of grace. After the mines became active, no ships either arrived in the
port or left it for a total of three hundred days. Although both the Soviet
Union and China alleged the mining was illegal, they relied on the 1958
Convention on the High Seas,43 and refuted U.S. claims that the mining
was defensive and allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 1907
Convention does not appear to have been referred to by either side. The
United States regarded the mining as a successful operation and the peace
agreement with North Vietnam followed soon after. Anchored mines that
broke free of their moorings duly exploded, in compliance with the 1907
Convention and the United States took action to render unexploded mines
harmless after the war ended.
Between 1987 and 1988 both Iran and Iraq laid mines in the Persian
Gulf. They were a distinctive feature of the war and they certainly had a
disruptive effect on both warships and merchant vessels. Western navies
deployed mine countermeasures vessels to clear mines in the Gulf and, by
the time of the ceasefire in August 1988, had discovered a total of seven
separate minefields and had cleared approximately ninety moored and a
similar number of floating mines. Several ships were damaged in the Gulf,
including the U.S.-flagged tanker Bridgeton on July 24, 1987 and the USS
Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988,44 and one tanker hit a mine eighty miles
south of the Straits of Hormuz in August 1987. The Iranian landingcraft/minelayer Iran Ajr was attacked and sunk by the U.S. Navy on September 21, 1987 while it was engaged in laying a minefield on the high seas
in an area of restricted navigation off Bahrain. The use of unanchored automatic contact mines during this period, including by Iran deliberately
placing them in the path of neutral merchant vessels, was clearly a breach
of the 1907 Convention.
Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq laid a minefield off the
Kuwaiti coast to deter the expected counter-invasion by coalition forces.
The field consisted of both contact and influence mines. Several drifting
43. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
44. Following the incident involving the Samuel B. Roberts, the United States launched
attacks on Iranian oil platforms in response.
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contact mines were encountered by coalition naval forces, although it was
not clear whether these had been laid deliberately to drift or had simply
slipped their moorings and not disarmed. Either way, the mines breached
the 1907 Convention. Two U.S. Navy vessels were struck by mines (the
USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine and the USS Princeton was damaged by an influence mine). After the cessation of hostilities, approximately
one thousand three hundred mines (a mix of contact and influence) were
cleared, principally by a mine countermeasures force led by the British. The
United States also laid mines by aircraft to hamper the operations of the
Iraqi Navy.
Other, relatively minor examples, of post-1945 mining operations occurred during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973,45 the Indo-Pakistan
War of 197146 the Anglo-Argentine War of 198247 and during the very early
stages of the Balkan Wars in 1991.48
VI.

CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE SAN REMO MANUAL

It is the practice outlined above that must lead into some discussion of its
effect since 1907, and to whether or not the Convention set in train a process through which practice was influenced by it and developed into customary law. Those looking into the development of customary
IHL/LOAC today are, of course, almost invariably prompted to consult
the major study of the subject carried out under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross between 1995 and 2005.49 Unfortunately, when it comes to that element of IHL/LOAC exclusively applicable
at sea, this is not possible. The Customary International Humanitarian Law
study avoided altogether an examination of the rules specifically governing
45. The Suez Canal was closed between 1967 and 1975 as a result of the two ArabIsraeli wars of 1967 and 1973. This had a serious effect on international shipping moving
between the Indian Ocean and Europe, adding over four thousand miles to the passage.
See James Freyer, The 1967–75 Suez Canal Closure: Lessons for Trade and the Trade Income Link,
VOX (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/1967-75-suez-canal-closure-lessonstrade.
46. Pakistan laid a minefield in the approaches to Chittagong in East Pakistan.
47. Argentina laid contact mines in the approaches to Port Stanley harbor and gave
notification of the presence of the minefield in April 1982.
48. Both Croatian and Federal forces laid mines on the Adriatic coast off the Federal
naval base at Lora-Split and off the besieged city of Dubrovnik, respectively.
49. The results of which were published as the Customary International Humanitarian
Law study in 2005. CIHL Study, supra note 2.
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the maritime aspects of armed conflict; those governing sea mining activities, were not, therefore, included. One reason frequently given for this
(and especially in response to the criticism that this was an unfortunate
oversight) is that the relevant law had already been comprehensively examined by a project conducted under the auspices of the Institute of International Humanitarian Law (IIHL) based in Sanremo, Italy. The outcome of
the IIHL’s project was published in 1995 as the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.50 The San Remo Manual is undoubtedly an extremely important reference on the IHL/LOAC applicable
at sea. What it says about sea mines will be central to a discussion of the
law relating to them, and leads to questions about the status of the San
Remo rules and how were they determined.
A number of factors prompted the IIHL to conduct its study into
IHL/LOAC at sea. First, there had been no formal development of the law
governing the conduct of naval operations during armed conflict since the
Second World War which, by then, had concluded fifty years earlier (the
only related treaty was the 1949 Geneva Convention II,51 which did not
focus on the means and methods by which naval operations are conducted). Second, the peacetime law of the sea had developed in significant ways
through the UN law of the sea conferences, especially the third of those
that took place between 1974 and 1982, and which resulted in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.52 Most significant for
naval operations had been the Convention’s extension and enhancement of
coastal-State jurisdiction and the formal introduction of straits transit and
archipelagic sea lanes passage. Although the Convention was a part of what
would traditionally have been referred to as the “law of peace,” its provisions would clearly have an impact on the conduct of naval operations in
time of war, especially in relation to neutral rights and obligations. Third, as
noted above, there had been a number of conflicts since 1945 with naval
dimensions that had highlighted legal issues, not least the then most recent:
the UN-mandated operation against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait
50. The date of the San Remo Manual’s publication, coinciding with the start of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s project leading to the Customary International Humanitarian Law study, was significant in relation to the decision not to include the law governing naval operations in the latter.
51. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
52. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
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in 1990, the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and the Falklands War in 1992. An attempt to develop treaty law relating to sea mines in the context of the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)53 failed to result in
any negotiations.54 While weapons law had developed significantly, and was
continuing to do so through the negotiation of protocols to the CCW,
there had been no development in weapons law dealing with naval weapon
systems since before the Second World War. For all these reasons, the
IHL/LOAC applicable at sea was certainly worthy of some reassessment.
The San Remo Manual was the result of a process of consultation and
discussion between 1987 and 1994 at two round tables and six meetings of
a group of naval experts and lawyers. Fifty-six participants, together with
ninety-four associated experts and observers, were engaged, many of whom
were serving naval officers and other officials.55 They represented every
region of the world and included individuals from a significant number of
naval powers, including each of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council. Although they contributed to the process in their personal capacity (not formally representing their States), their involvement was
often directly related to the official positions they then held in their navies
or government departments. Successive British Chief Naval Judge Advocates were engaged, for example, each handing the participation role over
to his official successor in office as the process moved forward.
The result of the process, published in 1995, was authoritative without
being either an attempt to develop conventional law or account for the
then current state of customary law. Indeed, it was innovative in several
respects in attempting to place the law of naval operations during armed
conflict into a late-twentieth century context. As a source of the law it is,
therefore, somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, it has become a frequently
53. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
54. The Convention has a series of protocols additional to it dealing with specific
weapons, new protocols being added as deemed appropriate. A proposal for such a protocol, dealing with sea mines, had been advanced by Sweden in the late-1980s, but the idea
was rejected. See BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 79–89, 94–97. The CCW does now include the
1996 Amended Protocol on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, but Article
1(1) states that it does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways. Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.
55. See the lists of those attending the meetings in the San Remo Manual, supra note 5,
at 46–55.
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quoted and widely used guide as to what the law ought to say about the
conduct of naval operations in armed conflict. In that sense, as it is consulted and used for that purpose, it has been having an effect on the development of both practice and opinio juris. It was, for example, used as the
first draft of the chapter on Maritime Warfare in the UK’s official Manual of
the Law of Armed Conflict published in 2004.56 Each of its rules was then reviewed, with those not reflecting either conventional or customary law being rejected. In the case of mine warfare, the UK’s Manual used precisely
the wording of the relevant San Remo Manual articles (rules 80 to 92 inclusive). It was British policy only to include reference in its Manual to what it
believed to be the law. The repeating of the San Remo Manual rules on mine
warfare can be regarded, therefore, as strong evidence that the United
Kingdom, at least, considers them to have legal force.
The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, an extremely important
publication, the original purpose of which was to be an expanded version
of the German manual on IHL/LOAC (expanded essentially by the inclusion of extensive commentary), is now in its third edition, but is no longer
“connected to a single national manual.”57 Its chapter on naval warfare in
all three editions has been the work of Heintschel von Heinegg, one of the
world’s foremost experts on this body of law, who was also involved in the
project to produce the San Remo Manual as one of the project’s rapporteurs.
It is of interest to note comments from the Handbook. On the subject of
the customary status of the rules in the 1907 Convention, it states that
apart from the problem of whether [the 1907 Convention] is of significance for modern mines, it seems to be the correct view that [the Convention) qua customary law remains a valid legal yardstick for the use of
automatic contact mines. [The Convention] has, therefore, acquired the
status of customary international law governing the use of automatic contact mines. However, its provisions are not applicable as such to other
modern mines. These are, it is submitted, governed by the rules and prin56. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (2004). The present author, who chaired the Manual’s Editorial Board,
as well as being one of the authors of its Maritime Warfare chapter, has previously provided a comparison of that chapter with the San Remo Manual, relating the extent to which the
United Kingdom utilized the San Remo rules. See Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36
ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (2006).
57. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 27, at
xvii.
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ciples of customary international law, which also provide norms regulating the area where naval mines—whether antiquated or sophisticated—
may be employed.58

While the rules contained in the 1907 Convention are regarded as having attained customary status in relation to automatic contact mines alone,
they have also, when combined with other elements of customary law, led
to the devising of the rules contained in the San Remo Manual.59 They apply
to all forms of sea mines (which are defined as “explosive device(s) laid in
the water, on the seabed or the subsoil thereof, with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or deterring ships from entering an area” 60).
VII.

CONCLUSION

Especially in relation to mining activities and their effect during the two
world wars, the stated and fundamental aim of the 1907 Convention contained in its Preamble—“to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as
far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled”—
was not achieved. The Convention did not prevent the twentieth century
increase in the use of sea mines during major war involving sustained naval
operations. Trade was massively and intentionally affected in both world
wars by the laying of extensive minefields in sea areas central to the war
effort of the belligerents. The sea mine had become an influential weapon
of war.
Nevertheless, one should resist simply writing the Convention off as a
completely ineffective instrument of regulation of wartime mining. There is
certainly evidence that some provisions contained in it have been acknowledged and applied—perhaps not with precision or by all belligerents in all
circumstances, but certainly in part and to an extent that is significant. That
in itself is a positive comment, not least when one acknowledges that the
Convention was never actually applicable in any of the wars/conflicts
fought during the years following its negotiation. At no time in any conflicts were all belligerents’ party to it and, for that reason, arguably none
58. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 27, at 504.
59. See Heintschel von Heinegg’s most recent discussion of the subject in Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg, Maritime Warfare, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
145, 162–63.
60. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 5, at 169. The definition is not included as a rule
itself, but is included in the commentary indicating that it was used for the purposes of
compiling the manual.
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were under a legal obligation to apply it as treaty law. In addition, the Convention was strictly concerned with automatic submarine contact mines,
which have never been the only type of sea mine available for use. In particular, from the outbreak of the Second World War influence mines began
to appear and have eventually become the most sophisticated mine of
choice for those having them in their mine inventory. One might make a
case—although I do not—that the significant concern motivating those
negotiating the 1907 Convention, to achieve an enhanced ability to comply
with the principle of distinction, provided impetus to develop smarter
mines than the automatic contact variety dominating mine warfare in the
early years of the twentieth century. Certainly today mines are very capable
of identifying even specific ships and can, therefore, be programed not to
respond to vessels that are protected civilian objects. The motive behind
the development of influence mines was, however, more to do with creating a more effective weapon consistent with the principle of war of economy of effort (not forgetting also, that of surprise!) than it was humanitarian (although the two outcomes can certainly chime).
Despite its shortcomings as a treaty, the 1907 Convention has, over a
period of more than a century, had an influence on the development of
customary law on sea mining. Despite the ambiguities inherent in its text
and its failure adequately to address some important considerations, in particular those to do with the sea areas in which mining is permitted, when
the rules in the 1907 Convention are combined with other rules of customary law (for example, those forming a part of the law of the sea), it is possible to identify a series of rules that can be applied to sea mines of all levels
of sophistication. The San Remo Manual contains a useful attempt to do this
and the Manual’s rules as drafted twenty years ago are obtaining a degree of
authority, as evidenced by their inclusion in national manuals, such as those
produced by the United Kingdom and Germany.61
The 1907 Convention’s rules are currently a part of the mix that has resulted in the San Remo rules. If those rules achieve progressively great authority over time, then one answer to the question to do with the need for
a new, updated convention is that it is by no means necessary. An attempt
by Sweden in 1994 to achieve that by its proposal for a protocol to the
CCW failed. There is currently no generally articulated need for a development in the conventional law. Such developments are, of course, more fre61. BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT IN
BEWAFFNETEN KONFLIKTEN (2013).
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quently than not prompted by events that serve to demonstrate the need
for new treaty law. For the moment, there seems little prospect for this as it
would probably only materialize as a consequence of a general naval war of
the like not experienced since 1945. This is despite periodic inconveniences, such as the mining of the Persian Gulf during both the Iran-Iraq War
and following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
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